Oakwood at Madison: A Tactical Retreat to Preserve the Mount Laurel Principle by Rose, Jerome G.
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 13
January 1977
Oakwood at Madison: A Tactical Retreat to
Preserve the Mount Laurel Principle
Jerome G. Rose
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jerome G. Rose, Oakwood at Madison: A Tactical Retreat to Preserve the Mount Laurel Principle, 13 Urb. L. Ann. 3 (1977)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol13/iss1/2
OAKWOOD AT MADISON: A TACTICAL
RETREAT TO PRESERVE THE
MOUNT LAUREL PRINCIPLEt
JEROME G. ROSE*
In volume 12 of the Urban Law Annual Professor Rose described
various fair share allocation plans that a court could use in implement-
ing the principles of the Mount Laurel decision. In Oakwood at Madi-
son, Inc. v. Township of Madison, the New Jersey Supreme Court
considered various fair share allocation plans but did not adopt any
particular model. In this Article Professor Rose analyzes the strengths
and weaknesses of the Oakwood at Madison decision.
After over six years of litigation, the New Jersey Supreme Court
finally rendered its decision in Oakwood at Madison v. Township of
Madison.' In a four to three decision, written by Justice Conford and
with separate opinions written by Justices Clifford, Mountain, Pash-
man and Schreiber, the court made a tactical decision to withdraw its
troops (i.e. the trial courts) from the losing battle of "statistical war-
fare" involved in the legislative-administrative process of defining
"region" and allocating a "fair share" of regional housing needs to
municipalities which appeared to be required by Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel.2
t Copyright @ 1977 by Jerome G. Rose. This article will be part of a larger work on
the subject to be published by Rutgers University Center for Urban Policy Research
entitled AFTER MOUNT LAUREL: THE NEW SUBURBAN ZONING.
* Professor of Urban Planning and Chairman of the Department of Urban Planning,
Livingston College, Rutgers University. Editor in Chief, REAL ESTATE LAW JOURNAL.
B.A., Cornell University, 1948; J.D., Harvard University, 1951.
1. - N.J. -, - A.2d - (1977) (No. A-80/81, Jan. 26, 1977).
2. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
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Oakwood at Madison is the New Jersey Supreme Court's latest
word in the litigation that gave rise to the concept of a municipal
obligation to provide for a fair share of regional housing needs adopted
by the court in Mount Laurel. The litigation started in September 1970
when the developer-plaintiff brought an action challenging the validity
of the Madison Township zoning ordinance. 3
The trial court held the zoning ordinance invalid on the grounds that
"it fail[ed] to promote reasonably a balanced community in accord-
ance with the general welfare." 4 The decision also said that in defining
a "balanced community, a municipality must not ignore housing needs,
that is, its fair proportion of the obligation to meet the housing needs of
its own population and of the region.' '5 This decision was appealed to
the New Jersey Supreme Court6 and was scheduled for argument in
March, 1973 and again in January, 1974, together with oral argument in
the Mount Laurel case. However, because Madison Township had
adopted a major amendment to the zoning ordinance the New Jersey
Supreme Court remanded the Oakwood at Madison case to the trial
court for a ruling upon the effect of the amended ordinance. The
supreme court then rendered a decision in the Mount Laurel case.
After a hearing on remand, the trial court held that the township's
obligation to provide its fair share of the housing needs of its region is
not met unless its zoning ordinance approximates in additional housing
unit capacity the same proportion of low income housing as its present
low income and moderate income population.7 The trial court found
that the amended ordinance did not meet this test and the entire
ordinance was therefore invalid. 8 In defining "region," the housing
needs of which must be met by the township, the trial court said that
the region is not coextensive with the county, "rather it is the area
from which in view of available employment and transportation the
population of the township would be drawn absent invalidly exclusion-
ary zoning." 9
Upon return of the appeal to the supreme court, oral argument was
3. Oakwood at Madison, Inc., v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d
353 (L. Div. 1971), modified and aff'd, - N.J.-, -A.2d - (1977) (No. A-80/81, Jan.
26, 1977).
4. Id. at 21, 283 A.2d at 358.
5. Id. at 20, 283 A.2d at 358.
6. Certification granted, 62 N.J. 185, 299 A.2d 720 (1972).
7. 128 N.J. Super. 438, 447, 320 A.2d 223, 227 (L. Div. 1974).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 441, 320 A.2d at 224.
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presented twice with emphasis placed upon the effect of the Mount
Laurel decision that had been rendered in the intervening period. The
New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the judgment with modifica-
tions. 10 In the majority opinion, written by Justice Conford, the legal
issues of the case were broken down into three questions: (1) Is the
zoning ordinance exclusionary? (2) Should the trial court demarcate
the "region" and determine the "fair share" of regional need? and (3)
What is the proper judicial remedy?1'
In answering the first question, whether the zoning ordinance is
exclusionary, the court made it clear that a zoning ordinance is "ex-
clusionary" if it "operates in fact to preclude the opportunity to supply
any substantial amounts of new housing for low and moderate income
households now and prospectively needed in the municipality and in
the appropriate region" whether or not such effect was intended. 12
Thus the New Jersey Supreme Court has taken a position that squarely
contravenes the position taken by the United States Supreme Court a
few weeks earlier in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp .3 In Arlington Heights the United States
Supreme Court upheld the refusal of a municipality to zone to permit
subsidized multifamily housing because there was insufficient evi-
dence to show a racially discriminatory intent even though such a
refusal had a racially discriminatory effect. In Oakwood at Madison,
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a zoning ordinance may be
"exclusionary" without a showing of exclusionary intent.
The test established by the New Jersey Supreme Court is whether
the zoning ordinance operates in fact to preclude the opportunity for
the requisite share of low and moderate income housing to be built.14
Under this new test it is not necessary for the municipality "to devise
specific formulae for estimating [a] precise fair share of the lower
income housing needs of a specifically demarcated region."' 5 Nor is it
necessary for a trial court to make such findings. 6 What is necessary
under the Oakwood at Madison test is a "bona fide" effort by the
municipality toward the elimination or minimization of undue cost-
10. - N.J. -, - A.2d - (1977) (No. A-80/81, Jan. 26, 1977).
1I. Id. at,- A.2d at -. (slip op. at 12).
12. Id.
13. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
14. - N.J. at -, - A.2d at -. (slip op. at 12).
15. Id. at-, - A.2d at -. (slip op. at 14-15).
16. Id.
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generating requirements in the zoning ordinance.17 In the language of
the court:
To the extent that the builders of housing in a developing munici-
pality like Madison cannot through publicly assisted means or
appropriately legislated incentives. . . provide the municipality's
fair share of the regional need for lower income housing, it is
incumbent on the governing body to adjust its zoning regulations
so as to render possible and feasible the "least cost" housing,
consistent with minimum standards of health and safety, which
private industry will undertake, and in amounts sufficient to satis-
fy the deficit in the hypothesized fair share. 18
Under this standard for evaluating the exclusionary effect of a
zoning ordinance the court held the Madison ordinance invalid because
(1) it designated insufficient areas for very small lots and multi-family
housing; 9 (2) it contained undue cost generating features such as
requirements for roads and utilities; 20 (3) it failed to provide for pros-
pective regional need for lower cost housing beyond 1975.21
The primary contribution of the Oakwood at Madison decision may
be its admonition to the trial courts to withdraw from the process of
"demarcating the region" and determining the "fair share" of the
municipality. 22 The court observed that this process "involves highly
controversial economic, sociological and policy questions of innate
difficulty and complexity. Where predictive responses are called for
they are apt to be speculative or conjectural.' '23 In a statement that
may have only limited significance, the court articulated the constitu-
tional truism that this process "is much more appropriately a legisla-
tive function rather than a judicial function to be exercized in the
disposition of isolated cases." 24 Nevertheless, after indicating its
awareness of the existence and importance of the fundamental princi-
ple of separation of powers in our legal system, the court stated:
But unless and until other appropriate governmental machinery is
effectively brought to bear the courts have no choice, when an
ordinance is challenged on Mount Laurel grounds, but to deal with
17. Id. (slip op. at 15).
18. Id. at-, - A.2d at-. (slip op. at 36). In footnote 21, - N.J. at-, - A.2d. at
-, the court explains that "least cost" housing is housing which can be built at the least
cost and still meet health and safety requirements.
19. Id. at -- A.2d at -. (slip op. at 53).
20. Id. at - A.2d at -. (slip op. at 53-54).
21. Id. at-, - A.2d at . (slip op. at 80).
22. Id. at -- - A.2d at -, -. (slip op. at 14, 54).
23. Id. at -, - A.2d at - (footnote omitted). (slip op. at 66).
24. Id. at-, - A.2d at - (footnotes omitted). (slip op. at 67).
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this vital public welfare matter as effectively as is consistent with
the limitations of the judicial process32
These preliminary statements alone would have left unanswered the
question of how the trial courts will deal with the concepts of "region"
and "fair share" when the validity of a municipal zoning ordinance is
challenged in an action before them. The opinion, however, continues
and provides some guidelines. Generally, the court concluded that
"there is no specific geographical area which is necessarily the au-
thoritative region as to any single municipality in litigation.''26 The
objective of the trial courts is to determine whether the zoning ordi-
nance "realistically permits the opportunity to provide a fair and
reasonable share of the region's need for housing for the lower income
population." 27 The technical details of the basis for fair share alloca-
tions of regional goals among municipalities are not as important "as
the consideration that the gross regional goal shared by the constituent
municipalities be large enough fairly to reflect the full needs of the
housing market of which the subject municipality forms apart.'"2 The
court then indicated its approval of the trial court's definition of
"region" as "the area from which, in view of available employment
and transportation, the population of the township would be drawn
absent exclusionary zoning." 29 The court also reaffirmed the statement
by Justice Hall in Mount Laurel that "confinement to or within a
certain county appears not to be realistic, but restriction within the
boundaries of the state seems practical and advisable.' '30 The opinion
predicted that an official fair share housing study of a group of coun-
ties or municipalities conducted under the auspices of a regional agen-
cy pursuant to the Governor's Executive Order No. 35 would be
entitled to prima facie judicial acceptance. 31
On the question of the computation of the "fair share" allocation for
the defendant municipality, the court was equally circumspect. The
court noted that "because of the conjectural nature of such calcula-
tions, utilization of the court as the forum for determining a municipali-
ty's fair share may result in 'statistical warfare' between the liti-
25. Id. at -, - A.2d at -. (slip op. at 69-70).
26. Id. at -, - A.2d at -. (slip op. at 75).
27. Id. at -, - A.2d at-. (slip op. at 81).
28. Id. at -, - A.2d at-. (slip op. at 70-71).
29. Id. at-, - A.2d at-. (slip op. at 71).
30. Id.
31. Id. at-, - A.2d at-. (slip op. at 72-73).
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gant's."'3 2 Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that "fair share studies
by expert witnesses may be of substantial evidential value to a trial
court." ' 33 The opinion then summarized the court's conclusion on this
issue.
Fair share allocation studies submitted in evidence may be given
such weight as they appear to merit in the light of [our above
conclusions]. But the court is not required, in the determination of
the matter, itself to adopt fair share housing quotas for the munici-
pality in question or to make findings in reference thereto. 34
After setting forth these general principles relating to the fair share
allocation to municipalities, the court directed its attention to the
specific issue of the relevance of ecological and environmental consid-
erations in this process. 35 Evidence had been offered at the trial relat-
ing to the adverse environmental impact of the proposed development
upon the surrounding area. The trial court had declined to consider this
evidence because there was a substantial amount of other land free
from such environmental impact available in the municipality with
which the fair share of its regional housing needs could be met.36 The
supreme court ruled that the trial court had erred in not receiving in
evidence and considering these environmental factors. 37 The court
said:
It is not an answer to say there is ample other land capable of
being deployed for lower income housing. The municipality has
the option of zoning areas for such housing anywhere within its
borders consistent with all relevant considerations as to suitability
38
To prevent future litigants from generalizing too broadly from this
statement, the court repeated its statement in the Mount Laurel deci-
sion that although ecological and environmental factors may be consid-
ered in zoning "the danger and impact must be substantial and very
real (the construction of every building or the improvement of every
plat has some environmental impact)-not simply a makeweight to
support exclusionary housing measures or preclude growth. 39
32. Id. at - n.39, - A.2d at - n.39. (slip op. at 66).
33. Id. at - n.5, - A.2d at - n.5. (slip op. at 16).
34. Id. at -, - A.2d at -. (slip op. at 81).
35. Id.
36. Id. at -, - A.2d at -. (slip op. at 82).
37. Id. at -, - A.2d at -. (slip op. at 83).
38. Id.
39. Id., citing Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
67 N.J. 151, 187, 336 A.2d 713, 731, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
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To prospective developers of higher density housing in suburban,
communities the most significant part of the Oakwood at Madison
decision may be the order of the court directing the issuance of a
permit for the development of the housing project proposed by the
developer-plaintiff. 0 The order, however, was made subject to the
condition that the developer comply with its representation that it will
guarantee the allocation of at least twenty percent of the units to low or
moderate income families. 41 However, the court did subject the en-
forcement of the order to the supervision of the trial court to assure
compliance with local regulations and to determine whether the de-
veloper's land is environmentally suited to the degree and density and
type of development proposed. 42
In addition, the court ordered the municipality to submit to the trial
court for its approval a revised zoning ordinance that would, among
other things, allocate more land for single family houses on small lots,
allocate more land for multi-family units, eliminate provisions resulting
in bedroom restrictions and eliminate undue cost-generating require-
ments.43 The trial court is specifically authorized, in its discretion, to
appoint an impartial zoning and planning expert or experts, to assist in
the process. 44
The full significance of an important judicial decision is seldom
immediately discernible. It is often necessary for some time to elapse
before the many complex ideas can be ascertained and interrelated
with each other and with the realities of the world in which they will be
applied. Some first impressions may be of interest.
The Oakwood at Madison decision reaffirms the Mount Laurel
principle that the zoning ordinance of every developing municipality
40. Id. at -, - A.2d at -. (slip op. at 93).
41. Id. This type of developer relief, requiring the construction of a mandatory
percentage of moderately priced dwellings, can also be part of a municipal zoning
scheme, known as an MPMPD ordinance. See generally Rose, The Mandatory Percen-
tage of Moderately Priced Dwelling Ordinance (MPMPD) Is the Latest Technique of
Inclusionary Zoning, 3 REAL EsT. L.J. 176 (1974). For a further discussion of
developer relief, see Hyson, The Problem of Relief in Developer-Initiated Exclusionary
Zoning Litigation, 12 URBAN L. ANN. 21 (1976). Note that the court did not engage in
"judicial rezoning" in formulating the relief to be granted; i.e., it did not map out
specific districts to accommodate low and moderate income housing. See Note, The
Inadequacy of Judicial Remedies in Cases of Exclusionary Zoning, 74 MICH. L. REv. 760,
768-79 (1976).
42. - N.J. at -, -A.2d at -. (slip op. at 93).
43. Id. at --- ; - A.2d at ---. (slip op. at 94-97).
44. Id. at -, - A.2d at -. (slip op. at 97).
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must afford the opportunity for the municipality's "fair share" of the
present and prospective regional need for low and moderate income
housing.45 Although the role of the trial courts is to be more con-
strained, the test of validity of a municipal zoning ordinance will
continue to be based upon the answers to such questions as (1) What is
the "region?" (2) What is "fair share?" (3) What is the present housing
need?" (4) What is the prospective housing need?"
In Oakwood at Madison the New Jersey Supreme Court has paid
homage to the constitutional principle of separation of powers and to
the concept of judicial restraint. The court has recognized the improp-
riety of judges engaging in the legislative and administrative processes
necessary to define "region" and calculate "fair share." ' 46 The court
has at the same time, however, made it clear that it intends to retain
such judicial power as is necessary to protect and preserve the integri-
ty of the judicial process. Having found in Mount Laurel that exclusion-
ary zoning violates the state constitution, the court does not intend to
abandon the judicial power to enforce its ruling. The Oakwood at
Madison decision should not be interpreted as a weakening of the
court's resolve to outlaw exclusionary zoning. The decision is based
instead upon a tactic designed to consolidate the judicial forces into a
position which will be less vulnerable to direct attack.
It is also interesting to note that most of the admonition relating to
the court's participation in the process of demarcating the region and
computing "fair share" is more applicable to Judge Furman's decision
in Urban League v. Mayor & Council (Carteret)47 than Judge Furman's
decision in Oakwood at Madison. Although the Urban League case
was not before the court there is little doubt that the court knew of its
existence and the extent to which a trial judge can become enmeshed in
the intricacies of the planning process.
45. Id. at -, - n.33, - A.2d at -, - n.33. (slip op. at 54, 55-56).
46. Id. at-.-, - A.2d at ---. (slip op. at 67-69).
47. 142 N.J. Super. 11, 359 A.2d 526 (Ch. 1976). The trial court accepted the
demarcation of Middlesex County as the "region." This decision was based upon
several factors: the county constitutes a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA),
20 of the 25 municipalities joined in a community block grant application as an "urban
county," and the existence of a county master plan and available statistics. The trial
court prescribed a three-step process for the calculation of each municipality's "fair
share" allocation of regional housing needs. The court first determined the amount of
low and moderate income housing needed in the county for the next ten years (18,697
units). The court made an initial allocation (total of 4,030 units) to each municipality to
bring each up to the county proportion of 15% low and 19% moderate income housing.
The court then allocated the remaining 14,667 units equally among the defendant
municipalities.
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Oakwood at Madison fails to provide an unambiguous standard for
municipal officials to determine, with some assurance, whether their
zoning ordinances will be upheld, short of completely abandoning all
programs of rational and comprehensive community planning. On one
hand the decision states that it is not necessary for a municipality
whose zoning ordinance is challenged to devise specific formulae for
estimating its precise share of the housing needs of the region. 48
Rather, the municipalities and the courts should look to the bona fide
efforts toward the elimination or minimization of undue cost generat-
ing requirements.49 On the other hand when a zoning ordinance is
challenged, the court will evaluate "fair share" allocation studies
submitted in evidence (although the court will not adopt a "fair share"
housing quota for the municipality). 50 Thus, it would appear that a
municipality could make a bona fide effort toward the elimination of
undue cost-generating requirements in the zoning ordinance but still be
vulnerable to attack on the grounds that it has not fulfilled its "fair
share" housing quota. Consequently each municipality and each de-
veloper-challenger of the zoning validity will have to prepare its own
study to support its position and the statistical warfare will continue to
be fought in the courtrooms. The only difference after Oakwood at
Madison is that the trial court will remain aloof from the proceedings
and only evaluate the alternative methodologies but will not prescribe
one for the municipality.
When the court ordered the issuance of a building permit to the
developer-plaintiff subject to the condition that the developer guaran-
tee the allocation of at least twenty percent of the units to low or
moderate income families, 5' it did not deal with the complex problem
of administering the procedure by which the benefits of low and
moderate income housing units would be preserved over a period of
time for succeeding generations of occupants. This issue creates a
difficult dilemma. If no attention is given to the implementation of the
mandatory percentage of moderately priced dwellings (MPMPD) re-
quirement, the first occupant of each of the twenty percent of the units
will benefit from the court-ordered allocation imposed on the de-
veloper. As costs rise and property values increase, however, subse-
quent occupants will have to pay the increased nonsubsidized costs of
48. - N.J. at -, - A.2d at - (slip op. at 14-15). See note 16 supra.
49. Id. (emphasis in original). (slip op. at 15). See note 17 supra.
50. Id. at -, - A.2d at -. (slip op. at 81). See note 34 supra.
51. Id. at-, - A.2d at -. (slip op. at 93). See note 41 supra.
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occupancy. On the other hand, to avoid the short-lived benefits to only
the first occupant, a system of administration would have to be estab-
lished that would control the rents of apartments or control the selling
prices of sales units. Either mechanism would subject the developer to
a form of regulation that would constitute a significant disincentive to
development.
The Oakwood at Madison decision recapitulated the misconception
of Mount Laurel that the state of the art of the planning profession has
been developed to the point where a competent, honest, and objective
professional planner can, with or without the aid of electronic data
processing devices, calculate objectively and accurately the numbers
on which "fair share" allocations can be made. There is an assumption
in both Oakwood at Madison and Mount Laurel that the disparity in
testimony from competing expert planning witnesses is the result of
the advocacy procedure and that planning truth can be found by the
simple device of turning to an objective source of information and
advice. This would appear to be the basis on which the court suggests
that fair share housing allocations made by regional planning agencies
(such as the Delaware Regional Planning Commission) would merit
prima facie judicial acceptance.5 2 This assumption also appeared to be
the basis for the authorization to the trial court to appoint an impartial
zoning and planning expert or experts. 53
The difficulty with this assumption is that honesty, integrity, compe-
tence, and objectivity alone are insufficient to extrapolate, project,
and predict the events upon which the future development of a region
will depend. The planning process is designed to formulate plans and
programs to achieve goals and objectives of the community it seeks to
serve. Professional planners do not make basic policy decisions, such
as whether the community seeks rapid growth, moderate growth, or
slow growth. An "objective" planner would base his projections and
calculations upon policy judgments of the appropriate community offi-
cials. For example, predictions of future housing need will depend
upon policy decisions relating to desired rate of growth. Actual hous-
ing needs, in most regions, will depend upon the extent to which
employment opportunities are generated in fact in the region. The
science, methodology, and art of predicting the number of future jobs
(i.e., industrial and commercial growth) in any given region have not
yet been developed to the point where an impartial regional planning
52. Id. at -, - A.2d at -. (slip op. at 72-73).
53. Id. at-, - A.2d at -. (slip op. at 97).
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agency or an impartial court-appointed planner can provide calcula-
tions of sufficient reliability to determine the validity of a municipal
zoning ordinance.
At some point in every comprehensive discussion of exclusionary
zoning it becomes necessary to remind all participants that there are
two separate and distinct questions that must be resolved if low and
moderate income families are to have an opportunity to live in subur-
ban communities. The first question is: Is land available in the com-
munity that can be used for "least cost" housing?54 The second ques-
tion is: Are subsidies available to close the gap between the cost of
housing construction and the amount that low and moderate income
families can afford to pay? The Oakwood at Madison decision focused
attention upon the duality of these issues and reaffirmed the principle
that the state constitution requires each developing municipality to
make land available for "least cost" housing. In response to the
second question, however, the court was unwilling to impose an af-
firmative obligation on developing municipalities to help to subsidize
construction costs. Although an amicus brief had suggested various
forms of affirmative municipal action to help subsidize these costs,"5
the New Jersey Supreme Court deferred this issue to another day.
The New Jersey Supreme Court is continuing its leadership in the
exclusionary zoning field. Oakwood at Madison reaffirms the princi-
ples of the landmark Mount Laurel decision and goes so far as to grant
specific relief to the plaintiff-developer. But municipal officials who
had hoped that Oakwood at Madison would provide an unambiguous
standard to determine the validity of their zoning ordinances may find
this latest decision unsatisfactory.
54. See note 18 supra.
55. Brief for the Public Advocate as Amicus Curiae, Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v.
Township of Madison, - N.J. -, -A.2d - (1977) (No. A-80/81, Jan. 26, 1977).
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